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The CLR-GB Office is a platform linking CLR 
activities at EU and GB levels as well as trade union 
and academic work in GB in the field of Construction 
Labour Research. It will support related initiatives 




You may have noticed that we have published less 
Newsletters and introduced an additional way of 
information and communication: ‘Mail extra’. We 
would greatly welcome a response relating to this 
change. 
A new publication in CLR-Studies is about to be 
published in English, French and German, Jan 
Cremers, Jörn Janssen (ed.) Shifting Employment: 
Undeclared Labour in construction. This book is 
an account of the present precarious situation of the 
contract of employment across Europe. The ‘Services 
Directive’ would further undermine remaining 
regulations for the protection of labour. Labour rights 
in the European labour market are indeed being 
targeted from all sides and everywhere, in the 
Scandinavian and Benelux countries as well as in 
Germany, France and other states who pride 
themselves to defend the European Model. Britain 
and Poland may be the exception. And the 
construction industry is one of the most vulnerable 
sectors. It was no coincidence that the Institute of 
Employment Rights asked Charles Woolfson  and Jan 
Cremers from CLR to speak at their conference 12 
July 2006 on ‘The draft Services Directive versus 
Social Europe’ (report in CLR-News 3/2006). The 
EFBWW has issued an evaluation of the last draft 
and a letter to the President of the European 
Commission (our last Mail extra). 
In the previous CLR-GB Newsletter we announced 
that we would continue discussing the Services 
Directive. We are well aware that information and 
sensitivity is not as much developed in Britain as it is 
in most continental countries. This is why we decided 
to use the whole space for an article by John Grahl, 
explaining the background and contents of the 
Directive in relation to neo-liberal policy which tends 
to regard any regulation as detrimental to competition 
and hence economic prosperity.  
We hope that this Newsletter will inspire you to join 
our AGM on 5 December 2006 at the University of 
Westminster, to discuss our 2007 programme.  
Jörn Janssen/CLR-GB, 7 November 2006 
 
Bolkestein and the  
Service Economy 
The European Commission’s proposed Directive on 
Services in the Internal Market (Bolkestein Directive) 
was an astonishing attack on the social models of the 
member states in general and on the rights of workers 
in particular. Although some of its teeth have now 
been drawn by the European Parliament (after a 
massive and almost universal campaign against it) the 
Directive is still a threat to the effective regulation of 
market economies.  
The growing importance of services in economic life 
results directly from their growing weight in output 
and employment. Services raise particular difficulties 
for the project of international trade liberalisation 
because often they cannot be delivered from a 
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distance but require the presence of the service 
supplier in the country which makes use of them. 
Thus it is not usually possible to separate trade issues 
from issues of international investment and the 
international movement of labour. 
The services report 
It is important to note that the Bolkestein Directive 
was produced by the Directorate-General for the 
internal market (of which Frits Bolkestein was 
Commissioner between 1999 and 2004). The issues 
concerned the functioning of markets which have 
already been fully liberalised in principle; they are 
therefore EU issues to be determined by qualified 
majority vote in the Council and with full co-decision 
powers for the European Parliament. However, the 
actual draft Directive made such vast incursions into 
member state autonomy that it might well have been 
challenged on these grounds, had the Parliament not 
drastically reduced its scope and impact. 
The specific character of Frits Bolkestein, a 
convinced neoliberal, may also have influenced the 
course of events. He is an economic liberal of very 
long standing, having represented the VVD in the 
Dutch Parliament for some twenty years. He takes a 
robust view of the need for market-oriented reforms 
in the European economy. 
In any case, the Commission (2002), in pursuit of the 
Lisbon objective of service sector liberalisation, 
produced a report on the ‘State of the Internal Market 
for Services’. Although the Commission shares the 
neoliberal Zeitgeist of most ruling groups in Europe, 
it is often more royalist than the king. Most 
proponents of the market economy recognise that 
many conceivable markets do not exist because there 
is little or no need for them. To the Commission on 
the other hand, the absence of any Europe-wide 
market is usually taken as a highly damaging 
consequence of non-tariff barriers. So it was with the 
Report’s identification of barriers to the cross-border 
movement of services. These relate to the fact that it 
is often necessary to have a presence in the importing 
country in order to deliver a service there. Thus 
service suppliers might need to establish themselves 
in that country, obtain inputs there, carry out 
marketing, distribute and sell the service concerned, 
and perhaps provide further services after sale. Each 
step could involve difficulties.  
The Bonfire of Controls 
On the basis of the report on barriers to trade in 
services, Bolkestein’s Directorate-General for the 
Internal Market prepared a draft Directive on 
Services in the Internal Market (European 
Commission, 2004). This had two outstanding 
features.  
Firstly, it sought to apply the principle of home 
country control to all transactions in services. That is, 
service providers operating in another member state 
would not be subject to regulation, of any kind, by 
that state, but would remain under the exclusive 
supervision only of their home country.  
The actual service provision activity would take 
usually place, in whole or in part, in the host country 
but would somehow be regulated, at a distance, by 
the home country. It was never made clear, in any of 
the discussions, how this could work – except by 
miracles of administrative ‘cooperation’ by the 
governments of the member states concerned. Nor 
was there to be any attempt at approximation of 
regulatory standards – rather, mutual recognition of 
regulatory regimes was to be, as far as possible, 
‘automatic.’ 
The legal chaos threatened by this approach to 
integration deprived the proposal of support from 
jurists. In essence the rules applicable to a service 
activity would become not only arbitrary – any one of 
twenty-five regimes might apply depending on the 
origin of the provider – but also potentially 
compound – if a dentist and an anaesthetist came 
from two different member states - the service 
activity they provided together might be governed by 
two different regulatory systems, both of them 
external to the country where the service was being 
provided, that is, that of the patient.   
Secondly, and in order to consolidate the regulatory 
disarmament of service-importing countries, the draft 
directive specifically outlawed a whole range of 
regulatory procedures. According to Article 16 host 
governments would not be allowed to: 
• oblige a service provider to be established on 
their territory; 
• require a service provider “to make a declaration 
or notification to, or to obtain an authorisation 
from, their competent authorities, including entry 
in a register or registration with a professional 
body or association in their territory”; 
• require the service provider to have either an 
address or a representative in the host country; 
• oblige the provider to comply with national 
requirements for service providers; 
• restrict the use of self-employed workers by a 
service provider; 
• require the service provider to possess an identity 
document issued by host authorities. 
Further, Section 2 of the draft imposed drastic limits 
on the supervision of service activities in general, 
whether the provider was domestic or external.  It did permit 
authorisation procedures for services where there was 
an “overriding” reason of public interest, but even 
these, exceptional, procedures prevented host 
authorities from using many measures. For example, 
they were not permitted to: 
  3
• require a service provider to be resident on their 
territory; 
• make service provision subject to a 
demonstration of economic need; 
• require a financial guarantee; 
• require registration for a period of time prior to 
service provision;  
• restrict the freedom of a service provider to 
choose between presence as branch, subsidiary or 
agency. 
In addition, a large number of administrative 
requirements would be made subject to strict 
limitations – that is, they would be permitted only if 
they could be shown to be non-discriminatory, 
justified by an “overriding” public interest and 
“proportional” (that is, not more stringent than was 
required to meet their objective). The requirements so 
limited included: 
• the imposition of territorial or quantitative limits 
on service providers (such as a minimum distance 
between them); 
• restrictions on the legal form of a service 
provider (for example, require the provider to be 
non-profit making, or a limited company); 
• requiring minimum capital to be held by the 
provider, or require the management of a service 
provider to have specific qualifications; 
• requiring minimum or maximum prices for the 
service; 
• requiring a service provider to offer specific other 
services with the service concerned; 
• require a certain number of workers to be 
employed; 
• restrict specific providers for any other reason 
than lack of professional qualifications. 
Further, no new restrictions of such a nature were to 
be introduced without the Commission being 
informed and reasons given for their introduction. 
The Commission would then have the power to strike 
down such rules or regulations. 
The cumulative effect of these proposed restrictions 
would be to render it extremely difficult and often 
impossible for governments or other authorities to 
control service activities. They would, in fact, find it 
difficult even to inform themselves about what 
service activities were taking place on their territory 
without breaking these rules. In order to bring about 
market integration of very dubious value it would 
subvert the entire regulatory structure of every 
member state and replace these relatively coherent 
structures, rooted in specific social histories, with the 
most complete anarchy.  
The immediate and massive opposition to Bolkestein 
certainly contributed to the climate in which the EU 
suffered a drastic loss of legitimacy, demonstrated by 
the rejection, in France and the Netherlands, of the 
Constitutional Treaty.  
Health Care, Posted Workers, Services of General Interest 
It is clear that the draft directive did have very serious 
implications for employment rights and that these 
were intentional. The situation for a worker who 
takes up indefinite employment in another member 
state is clear; the employment relationship is governed 
by the employment rules of the host country and the 
worker receives the full social security rights of the 
host country. This approach was firmly established at 
a time when the European social models were 
perceived as the political basis for the market 
economy; failure to give full national treatment to 
migrant workers was seen at that time as a barrier to 
integration. 
At an advanced stage of integration, however, 
increasing difficulties resulted from temporary 
movements of workers, often linked to the provision 
of services. These ‘posted’ workers might have 
employment contracts in their countries of origin (or 
in third countries) but they spent short periods of 
time in another member state. A notorious example 
of these problems arose from the presence of British 
construction workers in Germany in the first half of 
the 1990s, during the reconstruction boom in the 
Eastern Länder. Supplied by Dutch intermediaries, 
these workers broke every rule of the German 
employment regime, from limitations on hours of 
work, through health and safety regulations to basic 
compliance with the tax laws. 
The Posting of Workers Directive of 1996 attempted 
to bring some order to this chaotic situation. It 
specified that workers temporarily active in another 
member state (usually in order to provide some 
service) would be covered by a core of basic 
employment rights laid down by the host country, 
even though this might fall well short of full ‘national 
treatment’. Thus the host country’s maximum 
working periods, minimum rest periods, minimum 
rates of pay, health and safety rules, and equal 
opportunities rules would all apply, even though, for 
example, such workers would not be integrated into 
the host country pension system.  
However, even this very limited constraint on the 
employment of workers in other countries was seen 
as a barrier in the Bolkestein proposal. The draft 
recognised, in Article 24, that the host country 
authorities would have to be responsible for ensuring 
that the posted worker was actually accorded national 
treatment. In the same article, however, it proceeded 
to tie the hands of these authorities by forbidding 
them: 
• to require posted workers to be authorised or 
registered; 
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• to require their employer to have a representative 
in the country; 
• to require either employer or employee to hold or 
keep employment documents in the country. 
Amendments Proposed by the European Parliament 
The European Parliament (EP) considered the draft 
directive in detail in the autumn of 2005 and voted on 
it in February of 2006. By this time, the 
Constitutional Treaty had fallen victim to the massive 
loss of legitimacy of the European project even in 
countries, such as France and the Netherlands, where 
the traditional view had been very much in favour. By 
this time, also, the negative verdict on Bolkestein of 
all organisations except those of big business had 
become extremely clear. Even with its current 
conservative majority there could be no question of 
the Parliament simply endorsing Bolkestein. 
There is no doubt that the amendments passed by the 
European Parliament (2006) would significantly dilute 
the directive and reduce its impact on the regulation 
of service provision. The impact of Bolkestein’s 
proposals is reduced firstly by the exclusion of a wide 
range of services from the directive: health care is 
removed, as are some social services and several 
others. Secondly, the European Parliament states that 
the established legal position in several fields must 
not be changed by the directive. This is, in particular, 
the case for both labour law and social security so 
that the original provisions of the Posted Worker 
directive, as establishing minimum conditions, remain 
in force. Similarly, it is made clear that regulations 
designed to ensure cultural pluralism are unaffected 
by the services directive. Throughout the amended 
document, it is insisted that there are many reasons 
which will justify regulation of service activities, 
including regulation by the obligatory registration and 
authorisation of providers.  
However, not all the teeth of the Bolkestein directive 
have been drawn. Although the general requirement 
for regulation of service providers by their “country 
of origin” is removed, there is no clear assertion that 
regulation will be by the host country; rather a general 
“freedom to provide services” is asserted. And the 
relevant article 16 is little changed. It still contains a 
list of requirements and procedures which the 
service-receiving country must not impose.  
It would be complacent, therefore, to think that the 
European Parliament has blocked the Bolkestein 
initiative. The attempt to drive through a widespread 
deregulation of economic and social life on the basis 
of free competition in service sectors is still a central 
component of the current strategy of EU leaderships. 
John Grahl/University of Middlesex 
Future Events: 
CLR-GB, Annual General Meeting 
5th December 2005, 5 p.m. 
University of Westminster 
35 Marylebone Road, London NW1 5LS 
Provisional Agenda: 
1. Welcome 
2. Report of CLR-GB activities, critical debate 
3. CLR research in 2006 
4. Construction Labour Research at Universities 
4. CLR-GB programme for 2007 
5.  Drinks and chats 
Please let us know, if there are issues you want to be 
discussed at the meeting. 
Whoever feels like it may join us for supper in a 
nearby restaurant. 
 
To Our Readers: 
The CLR-GB Newsletter is the organ of exchange for 
CLR in Great Britain. This function depends on the 
co-operation of its readers. The editors ask everybody 
who is interested in construction labour to contribute 
with information and commentaries. Please send your 
suggestions, articles, information, letters, etc. to  
CLR-GB Office: 
Prof Dr Linda Clarke 
Westminster Business School 
University of Westminster 
35 Marylebone Road 
London NW1 5LS 
phone: 020 9115000 ext. 3158 
email: clarkel@wmin.ac.uk  
Or to the editors of the Newsletter: 
George Fuller 
119B Earlham Grove 
Forest Gate 
London E7 9AP 
phone: 020 85345352 
email: george@fullerg.fsnet.co.uk 
Jörn Janssen 
58 Freegrove Road 
London N7 9RQ 
phone: 020 77007821 
email: joern.janssen@btinternet.co.uk  
